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Introduction
Almost fifteen years ago, the Dutch-American political scientist Arend
Lijphart published a book entitled Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and
Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (1984). Lijphart argued that
ther~ are two main models of democracy: Westminster or niajoritarian
democracy and consensus democracy. The majoritarian elements of the
Westminster model include: the concentration of executive power in single-
party and bare-majority cabinets; executive domination of the legislature; a
two-party system; a one-dimensional party system and a plurality system of
elections. On the other hand, the elements of the consensus model which act
to restrain the majority include: executive power-sharing in grand coali-
tions; a balanced executive-legislative relationship; a multi-party system; a
multi-dimensional party system and proportional representation.
According to Lijphart, majoritarian democracy works best in relatively
homogeneous societies like the United Kingdom. The consenslis model, in
contrast, is especially appropriate for plural societies. Since the single most
important characteristic of Dutch politics is without doubt that the Nether-
lands is a plural society, a country of political and religious minorities
(Daalder, 1966; Andeweg and Irwin, 1993: 23), it is hardly surprising that,
at least as far as the five variables mentioned above are concerned, the
Netherlands can be considered to be the prototype of a consensus demo-
cracy.
The Netherlands has not only had a multi-party system but also a multi~
dimensional party system ever since the first attempt at a 'breakthrough' of
the existing party system finally became successful in the 18 70s. Both before
and after the Second World War, moreover, at least five political parties have
been 'relevant' (Sartori, 1976). Although at first sight therefore the model of
extreme, or polarized, pluralism seems to apply, Sartori himself has more
than once indicated that the Netherlands belonged in the category of
moderate pluralism (Sartori, 1976; Sani and Sartori, 1983; see also Daalder,
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1987: 266). As will be argued below, the Netherlands has retained its multi-
party and multi-dimensional character. However, the partial success of the
second major attempt at a 'breakthrough' of the party system, launched by
the Socialists immediately after the Second World War, has led to recent
speculation about a possible Ire-dichotomization' of Dutch politics. The
comparison between a first and a second attempt at a 'breakthrough' in the
party system was made by Bruins Slot (1952: 154-79) among others.
This chapter will deal with the historical development of the Dutch party
system before 1945, the contextual variables of most relevance, the post-
1945 party system and then the processes of change and adaptation up until
the present day.
Historical background before 1945
As was noted above, the single most important characteristic of Dutch
politics is, and has always been, that the Netherlands is a plural society. Two
cleavages have traditionally been of particular importance: religion and
social class. The oldest, and in many respects the most important, of the two
is religion. As a result of this cleavage, Dutch society has, since the origins of
the Dutch state in the sixteenth century, consisted of three main religious
groups: Roman Catholics (the oldest group), orthodox Protestants and a
secular or humanist minority.
Although the size of the different groups, as well as the relations between
them, has naturally varied over the centuries, these three groups, with their
distinctive identities and histories, have always been important. The exist-
ence of these three distinct groups has contributed to the fact that it has
proven extremely difficult, if not impossible, to write a truly comprehensive
political and social history of the Netherlands. Each of the three groups has
brought forth its own gifted, sometimes excellent, historians (Puchinger,
1979). However, the first real 'synthesis' ofDutch social and political history
has yet to be written, despite occasional claims to the contrary (see, however,
Israel, 1995).
Industrialization in the Netherlands took place later than in other Western
European countries. Therefore, the second cleavage mentioned above -
social class - did not become important until around 1880. Moreover,
because of the binding force that religion constituted within both the
Catholic and the orthodox Protestant segments of the population, only the
secular or humanist group was actually divided into two parts as a result of
this cleavage. Thus, from about the end of the nineteenth century, it has
been possible to speak of four minorities in Dutch society: the Catholics, the
orthodox Protestants, the secular working class or the socialists and the
secular middle class or the liberals.
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What makes the Dutch case interesting from a comparative point of view
is that for most of the twentieth century, the first three groups (Catholics,
Protestants and secular working class) have in effect been tightly organized
subcultures that structured most, if not all, aspects of political, social and
personal life in the Netherlands. In Dutch, these subcultures are usually
known as zuilen or pillars. The segmentation of Dutch society into these
different subcultures is called verzuiling or pillarization. The idea behind
this metaphor is that the four separate pillars were - like those of a Greek
temple - kept apart, only being joined at the top by the political elites, thus
supporting the 'roof' of the Dutch state (Lijphart, 1975; Van Schendelen,
1984). A caveat is needed here, however.
For at least some social scientists and historians, the term 'pillarization'
has a largely negative meaning. The period of pillarization between
1870-1960 is, possibly partly as a result of personal experiences and
frustrations, regarded by them as a culturally 'dark' period of Dutch history,
in which the political and religious elites of the day succeeded in controlling
their rank and file adherents on an unprecedented scale. Others, however,
are more positive about the same period in Dutch history, and they are even
inclined to regard it as a kind of second 'Golden Age' in which religious and
political life flourished once more (see, for example, Puchinger, 1993b). The
same caveat applies to the 1960s and 1970s. As a result of processes of
secularization and individualization and a number of other factors like the
impact of television and the effects of generational change, the pillars started
to crumble in the 1960s. Pillarization has become de-pillarization.
To many social scientists and historians, this marks a kind of liberation
from a 'medieval' past, and the dawning of a new era of 'enlightenment'.
Others, however, are increasingly worried about the effects that the secular-
ization and individualization processes may have on the cohesion of Dutch
society. They regard the present situation as being a culturally 'dark' era
because relatively few people and organizations are still trying to maintain
an explicit relation between their religious and other beliefs and social and
political action. This might even be an explanation for the widening 'con-
fidence gap' between Dutch citizens and the Dutch political system about
which a number of Dutch politicians and political commentators have
become increasingly concerned over the last few years (Van Gunsteren and
Andeweg, 1994). Because of the de-pillarization process, Dutch people are
finding it increasingly difficult to relate to parties and politicians that in their
eyes have become too technocratic.
No matter to which 'school' one belongs in this respect, however, there
can be no doubt that, despite the organizational and quantitative changes
that have taken place during the last twenty years, the Netherlands remains
a country of religious and political minorities. Roman Catholicism, the
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Reformation, and Humanism still constitute the three main foundation
stones on which Dutch society and civilization are built, although -like most
of its neighbours - the Netherlands has gradually become more multi-
cultural in the post-1945 period because of immigration.
Since the subcultures structured almost every aspect of social and political
life, it is only natural that the birth of Dutch political parties was very much
tied to the development of the pillars. Yet, it is not possible to fully compre-
hend the process ofparty formation, without first paying attention to the fact
that in the first half of the nineteenth century one could already speak of a
conservative-liberal dichotomy in parliament. The liberals were clearly the
dominant group. Among other things they were, with J,R. Thorbecke as
their renowned leader, the driving force behind the amendments to the
Dutch constitution of 1840 and 1848 by which modern parliamentary
government was introduced. In the latter stages of the nineteenth century,
however, liberalism gradually became dominant in many other sectors of
society as well, including the economy and the churches. Despite, or maybe
partly because of, their dominant position, the Liberals have traditionally
remained less organized than the three other groups in Dutch society (Taal,
1980; Daalder and Koole, 1988).
Thus, the first liberal party was formed only in 1885, and that was mainly
in reaction to the formation of the religious parties. In addition, until the
Second World War, and again after 1966, there have been at least two
separate liberal parties because of differences of opinion with regard to
universal suffrage and the role of the state in social and economic life among
other things. The most important of these were the conservative-liberal
Liberal Union (LU, since 1921 called Liberal State Party or LSP) and the
progressive-liberal Radical Democratic League (VDB, founded in 1901).
Meanwhile, around 1850 an orthodox Protestant historian and states-
man named G. Groen van Prinsterer began to free himself ideologically and
politically from the rival political group, the conservatives. In this process,
that had already started in the 1830s and that can only be explained against
the background of the complex religious and theological climate of those
years, the lectures he gave for friends during the winter of 1845-46 on the
topic of 'Unbelief and Revolution' played an important role (Groen van
Prinsterer, 1922 [1847]). Although Groen van Prinsterer would sit prac-
tically alone in parliament for another two decades, he indirectly laid the
foundations for what, in 1879, became the first national party organization
in Holland, the orthodox Protestant Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) (De
Wilde and Smeenk, 1949). By then, the conservative group in parliament
had virtually disappeared (Lucardie, 1988).
The name Anti-Revolutionary Party referred to the French Revolution,
which because of the principle of ni Dieu, ni maitre, was interpreted as a revolt
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against God. Its first leader was the charismatic A. Kuyper, who had also
authored the party's first programme.
By 1894, De Savornin Lohman, the parliamentary leader, and several
other more conservative members had left the Anti-Revolutionary Party,
with universal suffrage, as in the case of the liberals, being one of the main
divisive issues. In 1908, this group joined with two other small religious
parties to form a second orthodox Protestant party: the more theocratic
Christian-Historical Union (CHU) (Van Spanning, 1988). While most adher-
ents of the Christian-Historical Union belonged to the Dutch Reformed
Church, the Anti-Revolutionary Party drew its support largely from the
Calvinist churches that had been founded by Kuyper in 1892.
Although a Roman Catholic State Party (RKSP) was not formally estab-
lished until 1926, the Catholics were the second group within the Dutch
population to begin to organize itself politically (Rogier and De Rooy, 1953).
Originally, the Catholic members of parliament had worked closely with the
liberals. The main reason for this was that the Catholics had been dis-
criminated against in the time of the Republic (1579-1795), when the
orthodox Protestants had, despite their minority status culturally and eco-
nomically, been the dominant group and had acted very much as if the
Netherlands was a Protestant country. The Catholics expected, not without
reason, to benefit from their political co-operation with the liberals as the
latter were preparing the constitutional amendments of 1840 and 1848
which not only paved the way for modern parliamentary government but
also included the introduction of a bill of religious and other rights.
As a result, despite an emotional appeal from a number of orthodox
Protestants to the king, the episcopal hierarchy was reintroduced in the
Netherlands in 1853. During the 1860s, however, Cath.olics and liberals
gradually grew apart. One reason for this was that the Vatican, as well as the
:Dutch bishops, began to seek the establishment of Catholic schools, some-
thing which the liberals opposed. Another reason was that the liberals
successfully tried to end the official diplomatic ties that existed between the
Netherlands and the Vatican. Also more generally, the liberals became
increasingly anti-clerical. Following the example of Kuyper, in 1883 a poet
and priest by the name of H.I.A.M. Schaepman devised the first Catholic
political programme. Yet, as mentioned above, it would take until 1926
before the first Catholic party was formally founded.
One explanation for this was that the Catholics long remained hesitant
about involving themselves directly in politics after they had been dis-
criminated against for centuries. A second reason is that, for the Catholics,
political action was and has always remained, less central than activities in
other sectors of society. In this, they differed from the orthodox Protestants
and, to a lesser extent, the socialists.
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Not only did the orthodox Protestants and Catholics start to organize
themselves politically in the second half of the nineteenth century but they
also began to co-operate closely in parliament and the cabinet in the so-
called Coalition. This was a remarkable development because it occurred in
a country in which orthodox Protestants and Catholics had gone their
separate ways for centuries and in a period when no ecumenical contacts
whatsoever between their respective churches existed. The fact that the
Coalition was formed can to a large extent be attributed to the common goal
of the provision of public subsidies for religious schools that the two groups
shared, but as so often the good personal relations between Kuyper and De
Savornin Lohman, on the one hand, and Schaepman, on the other hand,
were instrumental as well.
The Coalition of orthodox Protestants and Catholics resulted in a number
of cabinets especially those after the First World War, and it did not break up
definitively until 1939. Before that, during the 1930s, the Anti-
Revolutionary Prime Minister, H. Colijn, had occasionally broadened the
Coalition by including the liberals, something he had been in favour of since
at least 1913 (Puchinger, 1969; 1980; 1993a).
The secular working class finally organized itself in the Social Democratic
Workers' Party (SDAP, founded in 1894), with P.J. Troelstra as its first leader
(Perry et aI., 1994). A socialist party had already existed before 1894 (the
SDB, founded in 1882) but under the leadership ofF. Domela Nieuwenhuis,
however, this party had developed more and more in an anarchist direction.
Until the Second World War, the socialists remained in opposition at the
national level because they were generally considered to be too radical and
too anti-monarchist to participate in government. Immediately after the First
World War, in 1918, they were even accused, wrongly, of staging a
revolutionary uprising.
This situation changed in the 1930s, when the Social Democratic Work-
ers' Party officially abandoned Marxism and turned more towards
personalism and socialist planning. In 193 7, it adopted a reformist pro-
gramme of basic principles that finally made the party acceptable as a
coalition partner for the Roman Catholic State Party in particular as well as
the Christian-Historical Union whose relationship with the Anti-
Revolutionary Party had deteriorated during the 1930s.
The Anti-Revolutionary Party had developed in a more conservative
direction, whereas the Roman Catholic State Party as well as the Christian-
Historical Union had gradually advocated more progressive policies in order
to combat the international economic recession. There had, however, been a
growing number of differences of opinion between the religious parties
already since 1917, when the common goal of public subsidies for religious
schools had been achieved. In 1939, a cabinet of Christian Historicals and
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Roman Catholics was formed, a cabinet that also contained two socialists for
the first time. In addition, there was one minister with an Anti-
Revolutionary background in this cabinet against the will of the leadership of
the ARP.
On the basis of the above, then, we can conclude that between 1879 and
1940 the Netherlands had a multi-party system and a multi-dimensional
party system. This is particularly the case since only the major political
parties have been mentioned above. Within all three pillars, in addition, there
were also several smaller parties (Lucardie, 1991). The most important of
these within the orthodox Protestant pillar were the Political Reformed Party
(SGP, founded in 1918 and currently the oldest political party in the
Netherlands), and after 1945, the Reformed Political League (GPV) and the
Reformed Political Federation (RPF).
Within the socialist pillar, there were the Communist Party of the Nether-
lands (CPH, later CPN) and, after 1945, the Pac~fist Socialist Party (PSP).
Although from time to time there have also been smaller parties within both
the Catholic and the liberal pillars, these parties have generally been more
short-lived. At the parliamentary elections of 1933, a record number of 54
party lists was submitted, 14 of which eventually proved successful.
Ifwe count the liberal parties as being one, however, only five parties were
strictly .'relevant'. Of the two traditional cleavages in Dutch society until
1940, religion was politically the most important although, especially
during the economic recession of the 1930s, it became increasingly clear
that important changes were under way (Koole and ten Napel, 1991).
Contextual variables
As is clear from the above section on history, the multi-party system and the
multi-dimensional party system that the Netherlands has known since the
second half of the nineteenth century, were mainly the result of the plural
character of Dutch society. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that
between 1848 and 1917 the Netherlands had a single member district
system. Of course, the introduction of a system of proportional representa-
tion in which the country was treated as a single electoral district and
universal suffrage in the latter year (universal suffrage for men was intro-
duced in 1917 and for women in 1919) made it easier for new political
parties to gain seats, especially since the Dutch electoral system is one of the
most proportional systems in the world (Daalder, 1975). Yet, it should
nevertheless be emphasized that around eight different political groups were
already represented in the Dutch parliament at the turn of the century.
The introduction of proportional representation and universal suffrage
had a noticeable impact on the relative strengths of the parties. More
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specifically, the liberals were reduced in size after 1917, whereas the three
major religious parties together acquired an absolute majority of the seats in
the second chamber which they did not relinquish again until 1967. Just as
the nineteenth century can be characterized as the liberal century in Dutch
politics in many ways, the twentieth century was to become the century in
which the Christian parties played a pivotal role.
Before 1917, cabinets had comprised either the liberal parties (which
together with the socialists constituted the Left in Dutch politics) or the
religious parties that represented the Right. Between 1917 and 1994 in
particular, the Catholics participated in every cabinet, except in the short-
lived Colijn Vcabinet in 1939, initially together with the two major orthodox
Protestant parties but increasingly also with either the liberals, or the
socialists, or both.
It is interesting to note that, despite repeated attempts at political and
administrative reform, the electoral system as well as other contextual
variables (Muller, 1993) have remained largely unchanged since 1917.
Compared with several other Western European countries, the Netherlands
can therefore said to be characterized by a relatively high degree of institu-
tional conservatism (Andeweg, 1989). Only very recently, after the
formation of the first coalition without the Christian Democrats since 1917
(see later), modest proposals have been put forward by the present Kole
cabinet for a reform of the electoral system (with the German electoral
system. acting as the main source for inspiration) and, more importantly, the
introduction of a corrective referendum at national level. According to some
authors, it is likely that in the near future elements of direct democracy such
as referendums and initiatives but also new techniques like 'deliberative'
polling will either be introduced or gain in importance (see, for example,
Beedham, 1993). One of the interesting things about such a development
would be that, as Lijphart himself has argued (1984), referendums and other
elements of direct democracy are not specifically related to the character-
istics of either model of democracy that we set out at the start of this
chapter.
Therefore, the distinction between majoritarian and consensus demo-
cracies in Western Europe might well become more and more diffuse if this
were to happen. Such convergence is, of course, also likely to occur as a
result of the continuing process of European integration. For the time being,
however, it remains to be seen whether there will in fact be a parliamentary
majority even for the modest proposals for institutional reform of the Kole
cabinet. There is a general feeling that, in order to achieve such support, any
proposals will have to be limited. Therefore, even if adopted, the reforms are
not likely to have a significant impact on the political system in general and
the party system in particular.
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As far as the individual political parties are concerned, over the past
decades, there has been a significant drop in the membership figures for
almost all parties. At present, only about 3 per cent of the Dutch population
is a member of a political party, compared to approximately 10 per cent in
the early 1960s. It should be emphasized, however, that this apparent
'decline' of parties does not necessarily imply 'the end of party'.
Given the fact that some form of representation will remain necessary in
the future, it is more likely that what we are really witnessing is a trans-
formation from the traditional 'mass bureaucratic party' to what Ruud Koole
has called the 'modern cadre party' (1992; 1994). At present, nobody seems
to long for the 'electoral-professional party' (Panebianco, 1988). On the
contrary, a sharper, instead of a more diffuse ideological profile for the
traditional political parties, might be one of the potential remedies when it
comes to closing the widely perceived confidence gap between Dutch citizens
and the political system.
The post-war party system
Following the Second World War, a second major attempt at a 'break-
through' in the Dutch party system was launched by the Social Democrats.
The main reason for this was that, as a result ofpillarization, they could only
appeal to non-religious voters. Therefore, unlike in neighbouring countries,
they were not able to attract more than 20 to 25 per cent of the national
vote. More specifically, the Social Democrats tried to reintroduce the two
party system and the one-dimensional party system that the Netherlands
had known in the first part ofthe nineteenth century. Like the earlier attempt
undertaken by Groen van Prinsterer around 1850, however, this second
'breakthrough' initially remained unsuccessful.
Before long, after the possibility of forming a unified, Protestant People's
Party had briefly been discussed, the two major orthodox Protestant parties
re-emerged as separate parties, whereas the Roman Catholic State Party
merely changed its name to the Catholic People's Party (KVP). As a result,
although an ideologically somewhat broader formation, the Labour Party
(PvdA) which was founded in 1946 closely resembled its immediate prede-
cessor, the Social Democratic Workers' Party.
This was even more the case, after P.}. Oud together with a small group of
other progressive Liberals, who had formerly belonged to the Radical Demo-
cratic League but had joined the Labour Party after 1945, became
disenchanted and left the party again in 1947. A year later, this group of
progressive Liberals joined with the conservative Party of Freedom (PvdV,
founded in 1945 as the successor to the Liberal State Party) to form the
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD).
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Thus, after 1945, the Netherlands retained its multi-party system as well
as its multi-dimensionality. At this point, the major parties of the Catholic,
the orthodox Protestant, the socialist, and the liberal pillars were,
respectively, the Catholic People's Party; the Anti-Revolutionary Party and
the Christian-Historical Union; the Labour Party and the People's Party for
Freedom and Democracy. Together, these five system parties used to win
between 86 and 92 per cent of the national vote during the first two decades
after 1945 (see Table 9.1).
As far as the importance of the two traditional cleavages in Dutch society
are concerned, however, there was a change in that after the Second World
War social class became the most important cleavage for a while as the
central issues of this period included the reconstruction of the country after
the war and the establishment of the welfare state. That social class had
become the most important cleavage was illustrated by the fact that the
terms 'right' and 'left' that had earlier stood for, respectively, the 'religious'
and the 'non-religious' parties, now came to mean 'conservative' and
'progressive' in socio-economic terms.
Partly as a result, there was once again, as in 1917, a significant change
as faras the composition ofthe cabinets was concerned (see Table 9.2). The
Social Democrats, who had entered government for the first time in 1939,
continued to take part in a series of broad 'Roman-Red' coalitions in the
years immediately following the war. From 1948 to 1958, these cabinets
were headed by a socialist prime minister, W. Drees. Between 1959 and
1989, however, the three religious parties mostly worked together (24 out of
30 years) with the liberals.
Some have argued that this was only natural since the Catholic Party in
particular was not so much a centre party but a party of the right (in the
socio-economic meaning of the term) and they were thus ideologically closer
to the liberals than to the socialists (Daudt, 1980). Others, however, have
correctly pointed out that this relatively long period of isolation between
1959 and 1989 was at least partly the socialists' own fault. More specifically,
the relationship between the religious parties and the Labour Party inevit-
ably suffered from the polarization strategy adopted by the latter party in the
1960s and 1970s. This will be dealt with in more detail later on.
Because of the importance of the socio-economic cleavage, the Labour
Party and (conservative) liberals worked together in only two cabinets, Drees
1(1948-51) and Drees II (1951-52). From 1959 onwards, they more or less
explicitly excluded the possibility of their co-operating within the cabinet,
thus making it much easier for the Catholic People's Party to play its pivotal
role in Dutch politics than would otherwise have been the case.
With the advantage of hindsight, it is possible to argue that a first
indication of the changes that were to come in the 1960s and 19 70s was the
Table 9.1 Dutch election results. 1946":-98
Party 1946 1948 1952 1956 1959 1963 1967 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998
KVP 30.8 31.0 28.7 31.7 31.6 31.9 26.5 21.8 17.7
ARP 12.9 13.2 11.3 9.9 9.4 8.7 9.9 8.6 8.8
CHU 7.8 9.2 8.9 8.4 8.1 8.6 8.1 6.3 4.8
CDA 31.9 30.8 29.4 34.6 35.3 22.2
SGP 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.8
PvdA 28.3 25.6 29.0 32.7 30.4 28.0 23.6 24.6 27.3 33.8 28.3 30.4 33.3 31.9 24.0 29.0
CPN 10.6 7.7 6.2 4.7 2.4 2.8 3.6 3.9 4.7 1.7 2.1 1.8 0.6
PvdV 6.4
VVD - 7.9 8.8 8.8 12.2 10.3 10.7 10.3 14.4 17.9 17.3 23.1 17.4 14.6 20.0 24.7
KNP - 1.3 2.7
GPV - - 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.6 1.8 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.3
PSP - - - - 1.8 3.0 2.9 1.4 1.5 0.9 2.1 2.3 1.2
BP - - - - 0.7 2.1 4.8 1.1 1.9 0.8
D66 4.5 6.8 4.2 5.4 11.1 4.3 6.1 7.9 15.5 9.0
PPR 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.3
DS'70 0.7
RKPN 0.4
RPF - 1.2 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.8 2.0
EVP - 0.5 0.7 0.2
Centre - 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.9 2.5 0.6
GL - - - - 4.1 3.5 7.3
AOV - - - - - 3.6 0.5
Unie 55+ - - - - 0.9 0.5
SP - - 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.3 3.5
Table 9.1 contd.
Source: Andeweg and Irwin, 1993: 105; Daalder and Schuyt, 1986: A1300-27 (supplemented for 1998).
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Table 9.2 Government composition in the Netherlands, 1945-94
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Date installed Prime Minister Composition!
24 June 1945 Schermerhorn PvdAIKVP/ARP/np
3 July 1946 Beel I PvdAIKVPlnp
7 August 1948 Drees I PvdAIKVP/CHUIVVD/np
15 March 1951 Drees II PvdAIKVP/CHUlVVD/np
2 September 1952 Drees III PvdAIKVP/ARP/CHUInp
13 October 1956 Drees IV PvdAIKVP/ARP/CHU
22 December 1958 Bee! II KVPIARP ICHU
19 May 1959 De Quay KVPIARPICHUIVVD
24 July 1963 Marijnen KVPIARP/CHUIVVD
14 April 1965 Cals PvdAIKVPIARP
22 November 1966 Zijlstra KVPIARP
5 April 1967 Dejong KVPIARP/CHUlVVD
6 July 1971 Biesheuvel I KVPIARP/CHUIVVD/DS70
20 July 1972 Biesheuve! II KVPIARP/CHUIVVD
11 May 1973 Den Uyl PPRIPvdAID66/KVPlARP
19 December 1977 Van Agt I CDAIVVD
11 September 1981 Van Agt II PvdA/D66/CDA
29 May 1982 Van Agt III D661CDA
4 November 1982 Lubbers I CDAIVVD
14 July 1986 Lubbers II CDAIVVD
7 November 1989 Lubbers III PvdAICDA
22 August 1994 Kok PvdAID66/VVD
1 Party of the Prime Minister in italics; np = non-partisan.
Source: Andeweg and Irwin, 1993: 119 (supplemented for 1994)
formation of the Farmers' Party (BP), a rightist protest party in the late
1950s. More importantly, in 1966 a party called Democrats '66 (D'66) was
founded. Over the years, this party has developed into a progressive-liberal
system party not unlike the pre-War Radical Democratic League, as opposed
to the conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy. The
original purpose of D'66, however, was to 'explode' the pillarized party
system.
Apart from the Farmers' Party and Democrats '66, severalother 'new'
parties were to enter the Dutch parliament during the 1960s and the 19 70s
such as the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), which had gained two seats in
1959 already, the Radical Party (PPR) and the Democratic Socialists '70
(DS'70).
As in other Western European countries and the United States, new 'post-
materialist' issues such as the environment, peace, and the need for
individual self-expression suddenly appeared on the political agenda. As will
become clear later on, however, in the end, these issues would not replace
religion and social class as the two most important cleavages in Dutch
politics.
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Change and adaptation
By the time Democrats '66 was founded, the traditional pillars in Dutch
society had already started to crumble (Blom and Van der Plaat, 1986; Irwin
and Van Holsteyn, 1989a; 1989b). As far as political life is concerned, the
parliamentary election of 1967 marked a turning point. Until 1994, the
election of 1967 was the only really 'historic' national election the Nether-
lands had experienced since the introduction of the system of proportional
representation and universal suffrage in 1917.
The election of 1967 was important for a number of reasons, particularly
because the three religious parties lost their combined parliamentary major-
ity which they had enjoyed continuously for 50 years. Second, the Catholic
People's Party especially lost votes dramatically. In just nine years, between
1963 and 1972, the party lost almost half its seats in parliament. Third, the
Labour Party also reached a historic low point of 23.6 per cent of the vote.
Fourth, the liberals, who had always opposed the principle of pillarization
because of their conviction that religion was and had to remain essentially a
private matter, gained one seat. Fifth, both the new Farmers' Party and
Democrats '66 were highly successful in 1967.
Partly because of the heavy vote losses of the religious parties, in particular
the progressive parties, but to a certain extent also the liberals, adopted the
so-called 'polarization strategy' (Daalder, 1986; Tromp, 1989). By doing
away with the 'accommodationist' political style of the 1940s and 1950s, it
was hoped by the progressive parties that the electorate would be forced into
two opposing camps. The religious parties would then either have to choose
co-operation with the left-wing parties or with the right-wing parties. In
either case, they would split and, as a result, disappear. The main purpose of
this strategy was therefore to achieve the 'breakthrough' in the party system
which had ultimately failed immediately after the Second World War.
Once again, these efforts turned out to be in vain, however, and eventually
even counter-productive. They were counter-productive because the rel-
atively hostile political environment proved to be an extra stimulus for the
merger of the two major orthodox Protestant parties and the Catholic
People's Party into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) in 1980. Other
incentives for co-operation between the three parties that had formerly
belonged to two different pillars included the clearly decreasing hold which
the Anti-Revolutionary Party, the Christian-Historical Union and the Cath-
olic People's Party had upon their respective Protestant and Catholic
electorates and the wish of important portions of the Catholic and orthodox
Protestant subcultures to nevertheless maintain an explicit relation between
the Christian faith and political action.
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In addition, the fact that the leaders of the three parties had come to know
each other in the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (the European Christian
Democratic Movement) and the strong desire within all three parties for co-
operation at the municipal and provincial levels were significant (ten Nape!,
1992; see also Lucardie and ten Nape!, 1994). This merger of the three
religious parties into the Christian Democratic Appeal can be regarded as the
single most important party political renewal in the Netherlands since the
Second World War.
Although the Christian Democrats have no longer occupied a majority
position in parliament but only about one third of the seats since 1967, they
have been able to maintain their strong position in the centre of Dutch
politics and even strengthen their crucial role during cabinet formations by
merging. As a result, until 1994, it proved to be impossible to form a national
coalition without the Christian Democrats. A similar attempt by Democrats
'66, the Labour Party and the Radical Party to form a progressive people's
party failed in the early 1970s.
After a brief intermezzo, the Den Uyl cabinet of 1973-77 in which the
Socialists worked together with representatives from the Catholic People's
Party and the Anti-Revolutionary Party, the Christian Democrats between
19 77 and 1989 largely maintained their co-operation with the liberals that
had started in 1959, with the main issue now being the crisis of the welfare
state.
In 1986, the Christian Democrats even openly announced before the
elections that they wanted to continue the prevailing coalition for the first
time in Dutch parliamentary history. Paradoxically, this polarization strat-
egy of the right, as it has been called, did not lead to a split within the
Christian Democratic party, but instead to a 'landslide' victory of nine seats.
Moreover, for the first time, the Christian Democratic Appeal proved able to
attract a substantial number ofnon-religious voters. At least in part, this was
made possible by the popularity of the then prime minister and leader of the
CDA, Ruud Lubbers (ten Napel, 1995).
In 1989, however, the parliamentary caucus of the People's Party for
Freedom and Democracy (VVD) withdrew its support from the second
Lubbers cabinet. After the liberals had been defeated in the elections that
were subsequently held, a third Lubbers cabinet was formed which consisted
of Christian Democrats and Labour. By that time, the Labour Party had
distanced itself through a series of programmatic and organizational reviews
from the style and postures adopted in the late 1960s and the 19 70s, notably
and in particular the polarization strategy (Wolinetz, 1993). In a sense, this
coalition of Christian Democrats and Labour therefore appeared to mark the
end of a period of relative turmoil in Dutch politics and the return to the
system 'of consociational or consensus democracy that had existed until the
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1960s. Particularly at the start, this cabinet was sometimes compared to the
series of broad 'Roman-Red' coalitions headed by Drees between 1948 and
1958.
In 1994, however, the Christian Democratic and Labour system parties
performed especially poorly in the second chamber elections. The Christian
Democratic Appeal suffered an unprecedented loss of 13 per cent of the
national vote, whereas the Labour Party was back at its historic low point of
1967 with a mere 24 per cent of the vote (a loss of 8 per cent). The post-
materialist Democrats '66, on the other hand, performed so well that it
actually doubled in size. The conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom
and Democracy (VVD) also gained 5.4 per cent of the vote. It had now
become clear that the conservative liberals were the main party to gain from
the process of de-pillarization.
Although, as we saw above, the People's Party for Freedom and Demo-
cracy suffered electoral losses during the second half of the 198Os as a result
ofleadership problems (after having polled 23.1 per cent in 1982), it won 20
per cent of the vote in the national elections in 1994 as against barely 8per
cent in 1948 (see Table 9.1). In the provincial elections of 1995, which
cannot of course be directly compared to second chamber elections, this
percentage had rocketed to an astonishing 27.2 per cent. Given these figures,
it is hardly surprising that the charismatic leader of the parliamentary party
of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, Bolkestein, was Widely
considered to be a serious candidate to succeed Kok as prime minister, if the
former's party were to become the largest party at the 1998 election. This
turned out not to be the case, however.
For Labour, the corresponding figures are 24 per cent in 1994 as against
28.3 per cent in 1946 and for the Christian Democrats, 22.2 per cent in
1994 as against 51.5 per centin 1946. One further remarkable development
was, that, in 1994, two new 'single issue' parties entered parliament, the
Aged League (AOV) and the Union of those 55 or older (Unie 55+).
It is still difficult to interpret what really happened in 1994. It is certain,
however, that specific events played a significant role, particularly in the loss
that the Christian Democratic Appeal suffered. Several of these incidents
were a direct result of the rapidly deteriorating personal and political
relationship between the Christian Democratic Prime Minister Lubbers, who
had already indicated in 1990 that he did not want to continue his job after
the next election, and his successor, Brinkman, whom Lubbers had himself
appointed. This led to increasing tensions between the parliamentary party
of the CDA in the Second Chamber, under the leadership of Brinkman, and
the Christian Democratic ministers in the Lubbers III cabinet.
In the end, it was unclear for "many Christian Democratic voters whether,
by voting for the Christian Democratic Appeal, they would be supporting the
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Centre-Left policies of the Lubbers III cabinet or the more conservative
policies advocated by the parliamentary party. In the case of the Labour
Party, their heavy electoral loss can at least in part be attributed to the
manner in which they handled the revision of the disability law in 1993.
Structural factors, however, are also likely to have played a role. In
particular, it can be argued that, once again, there was a change with regard
to the relative importance of the two traditional cleavages in Dutch society,
in that social class lost some of the prominence it had as a cleavage during
most of the post-war period. As in other Western European countries, the
Dutch Labour Party has been so successful in achieving their original
political goals that they have, in a sense, become a party without a 'heart-
land'. The old working class has virtually disappeared, although it can be
argued that because of technological developments (with the advent of 'the
information age'), new forms of inequality are already emerging.
Religion, on the other hand, still plays a crucial role in Dutch politics and
society and it may once again become the most important cleavage as the
Netherlands enters the twenty-first century, even though quantitatively
speaking the Catholics and orthodox Protestants are significantly smaller in
number than in the nineteenth century. Moreover, while at present, still half
of the Dutch population regards itself as 'Christian', according to some
researchers, this percentage will have dropped to about 20 per cent in the
year 2020 (Becker and Vink, 1994).
Consequently, one of the most hotly debated issues in Dutch politics today
is whether, as a result of processes of secularization and individualization,
the Netherlands is gradually disintegrating as a society. As was argued in a
report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), there used to
be four social groups or pillars. Now there appear to b~ about 15 million
individuals (Eigentijds burgerschap, 1992).
As a result, a new cultural dichotomy has gradually developed between
the liberal parties, who regard the development of society since the 1960s as
predominantly positive and the Christian Democrats who tend to emphasize
the potential risks and are therefore more pessimistic in their outlook. In this
sense, the Christian Democratic Appeal is a communitarian party, although
the ideological differences between communitarians like Amitai Etzioni and
Alasdair MacIntyre, on the one hand, and Christian Democratic political
philosophies, on the other, should not be underestimated.
The intriguing question is which position Labour will eventually choose in
this controversy. At present, the party seems to be paralysed by the tensions
between its liberal and communitarian wings. The People's Party for Free-
dom and Democracy also has a communitarian wing which is currently
relatively weak, however.
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The renewed importance of the religious or cultural cleavage is demon-
strated by the fact that after the elections of 1994 a so-called 'purple' (PvdA
red and VVD blue mixed together) coalition of conservative and progressive
Liberals and Labour was formed. Apparently, the traditional socia-economic
differences between in particular the Labour Party and the People's Party for
Freedom and Democracy have become so small that the possibility of them
working together in cabinet no longer needs to be definitively excluded.
Consequently, if the national election of 1967 was the first 'historic'
election after the introduction of a system of proportional representation and
universal suffrage in 1917 because the religious parties lost their combined
parliamentary majority, the election of 1994 might well be called the second
'historic' election because the Christian Democrats lost their pivotal position
in the process of government formation. One could indeed argue, that the
attempt at a 'breakthrough' of the existing party system launched by Labour
after the Second World War has finally been successful, even though the
liberals are the main party to gain.
\
It is tempting to draw a comparison between the present political and
religious climate and that of the first half of the nineteenth century. Once
again, liberalism is dominant. Once again, the Christian Democrats are in
opposition to liberalism and the spirit of the French Revolution, the latter in
a sense being represented by the coalition ofLabour, and conservative (VVD)
and progressive (D'66) liberals.
Yet, if one looks carefully, there are already signs that the policies
advocated by more or less communitarian parties like the Christian Demo-
cratic Appeal and (depending on the outcome of the internal power struggle
between its liberal and communitarian wings) the Labour Party might gain
popularity once more.
In addition, social class is not likely to completely disappear as a cleavage,
and the liberals have an important role to play in the battle against post-
modernism, in particular the idea that western political systems are entering
a kind of post-institutional era (Guehenno 1993). This, in combination with
the fact that the three traditional groups in Dutch society are still in evidence,
reinforces the expectation that the four major Dutch parties will all have
important roles to play in the years ahead.
Conclusion: resilience amidst change
The concept of the 'core' of a party system as developed by Gordon Smith
seems to be particularly useful as a means of describing the developments
which have taken place in the Dutch party system since the Second World
War. In an article published in the Journal of Theoretical Politics in 1989,
Smith concluded that:
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What emerges from a review of a cross-section of recent West European experi-
ence is that, whatever else may be changing, the essential core of party systems
is remarkably unscathed. Typically, we can observe a three-stage process:
1. an initial reverse suffered by some or all of the core parties as new parties
gain support and electoral volatility rises;
2. a period offlux with the core parties in disarray and adopting strategies of
adaptation;
3. finally a restabilization, the core parties recovering at least a substantial
part of their electorate and able to reassert their governing position.
(1989a: 361-2)
As far as the Netherlands is concerned, it can indeed be argued that there
have been reverses suffered by several core parties - in particular the
Christian Democrats and Labour (in the late 1960s), then a period of flux
(the 19 70s) and a restabilization of the party system (in the 1980s). Clearly,
there has been no complete reversion to the status quo ante, if only because
the Christian Democrats have recently lost their pivotal position in Dutch
politics and the Labour Party was back at a historic low point as well in
1994. In this sense, Wolinetz was certainly correct when he wrote that '[t]he
Dutch party system provides fertile ground for exploring party system
change' (1988: 130).
There has indeed been party system change in the sense that 'as a result of
ideological, strategic, or electoral shifts, there is a transformation of the
direction of competition or the governing formula' (Mair, 1989: 25 7). What
is even more striking, however, is the resilience of the party system. Without
doubt, the core of the Dutch party system as defined in this chapter has been
preserved (Smith, 1989a: 358-9; 1989b). In this sense, the subtitle of a
volume on Dutch politics that was published in 1989, Politics in the Nether-
lands: How Much Change? (Daalder and Irwin, 1989), still applies, suggesting
as it does both that there have been changes, and that doubts are legit-
imately possible as to whether there is not also a high degree of continuity.
One of the contributors to that volume, Arend Lijphart, concluded that
even without all the measuring that he had performed:
the adoption of a broad comparative perspective readily shows that the
changes in the operation of Dutch democracy should not be exaggerated. The
overall pattern of the new Dutch politics in the 1967-88 period still looks a
great deal more like the old 1946-67 Dutch politics than lilw British or New
Zealand politics. The Netherlands has merely moved from the politics of
accommodation to the politics of relatively less accommodation and relatively
more adversarial relations - and it clearly does not qualify yet to be a member
of the family of adversarial and majoritarian democracies.
(1989: 151)
Although more recent evidence suggests that the Netherlands is no longer
one of the most consensual European democracies, this is largely a result of
182 Hans-MarUen ten Nape]
developments in other countries. According to Mair (1994b: 99, 121), the
character of Dutch politics itself has not changed dramatically in the past
twenty years, and in any case continues to be consensual. More specifically,
the Netherlands appears to have retained its century-old multi-party system
as well as its multi-dimensionality. Because of the merger of the three
religious parties, on the one hand, and the success ofDemocrats '66, on the
other, there are now four instead of five major parties. Together, however,
these traditional parties provided further evidence of long-term stability
(Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mair, 1993), attracting a remarkable 81.7 per
cent of the vote in 1994.
One relatively small change to note is that, in 1989, the Communist Party
of the Netherlands joined with three other small Leftist parties (the Pacifist
Socialist Party, the Radical Party and the Evangelical People's Party that was
formed in the 19 70s as a protest against the merger of the three confessional
parties in the Christian Democratic Appeal) to form the Green Left (GL). In
the 1998 parliamentary elections, this combination polled 7.3 per cent. The
extreme left-wing Socialist Party (SP) polled 3.5 per cent whereas the
extreme right-wing Centre Democrats are not represented any longer in
parliament. The Aged League and the Union of Those 55 or Older started to
disintegrate almost immediately after the 1994 election had tal\:en place,
whereas the three smaller religious parties are more or less stable.
It remains to be seen therefore whether the outcome of the parliamentary
election of 1994 and the formation of the first cabinet without Christian
Democrats since 1917, has marked the beginning of an era of more or less
radical change in the Dutch political and party system. After the substantial
gains by the Labour Party and the People's Party for Freedom and Demo-
cracy of 5 and 4.7 per centrespectively, and the renewed loss of the Christian
Democrats of 3.8 per cent in 1998, there is increasing speculation about the
latter being reduced to the status of a 'non-relevant' party. It has been one of
the underlying theses of this chapter, however, that what we haveexperi-
enced thus far is merely another change in the relative importance of the two
traditional cleavages in Dutch politics, namely, religion and social class. The
overall conclusion must be that, although there has been party system
change in the Netherlands, the party system has also demonstrated a high
degree of resilience in terms of the parties that comprise its stable and
enduring core.
